

























Abstract: This study uses a new, innovative measure of trade protection and finds that less trade 
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The relationship between trade policy and the level of income is still an open question in 
the development literature. Theoretical models show that trade openness promotes an efficient 
allocation of resources through comparative advantage, leading to increased income levels. 
However, the empirical evidence is still mixed.
1 One potential explanation for the often 
contrasting results is the difficulty in measuring “trade liberalization” or “openness”. A large 
number of studies used trade volumes, or the share of trade in GDP as proxies for trade 
openness.
2 Others have used trade barriers, like average or import-weighted average tariff rates
3 
or composite measures, like Dollar’s (1992) price distortion and variability index or Sachs and 
Warner’s (1995) openness index.  
However, none of these measures is without major shortcomings. As Kee et al. (2009) 
note, the volume of trade may also capture macroeconomic shocks, differences in tastes and 
other factors not related to trade policy; the composite measures may reflect poor economic 
management, or are primarily affected by geographic characteristics. The arithmetic or the trade-
weighted average tariffs are without theoretical foundation and they may also introduce 
significant biases in estimation (Manole and Martin, 2006).  
This paper furthers our knowledge of the relation between trade openness and income by 
using a new, innovative index of trade restrictiveness (TRI), which is consistent and based on 
theoretically sound aggregation procedures. In addition, we account for misspecification errors 
by carefully including in the regression geography-related and institutional variables that are 
likely to influence the level of income.
4 We also account for possible endogeneity in estimation 
by using an instrumental variables technique. 
We focus on 131 countries, both developed and developing and find that lower level of 
trade protection is associated with higher per-capita income. The results are robust to accounting 




                                                 
1 See Yahikkaya (2003) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for an extensive review of the literature. 
2 See among others Frankel and Romer (1999), Irwin and Tervio(2002), etc. 
3 See Edwards (1998), Clemens and Williamson (2001), etc. 
4 Rodrik et al. (2004) highlight the importance of institutional quality in the trade-income regressions. 3 
 
2. The Trade Restrictiveness Index 
 
In this paper we use the framework proposed by Bach and Martin (2001) and Manole and 
Martin (2006), which built on the seminal paper by Anderson and Neary (1996). We calculate 
yearly Trade Restrictiveness Indices that measure the degree of protection in the economy for 
131 countries, between 1990 and 2004.
5 For every country and year we build a model of the 
economy taking into account all import tariffs, and calculate the welfare level in the economy. 
The TRI is the equivalent uniform tariff that leaves the welfare level unchanged. This aggregator 
is obtained by solving a system of nonlinear equations.  
 
The model assumes that the structure of a competitive, small open economy can be 
captured by the following system of equations: 
The income-expenditure condition, 
(1)  e(p, u) - r(p, v) - (ep  - rp  )′(p - p
w) -  f =  0 
and the vector of  behavioral equations
6, 
(2)  ep (p, u) - rp(p, v) = m 
where e(p,u) is the expenditure function of the representative household, p is a given vector of 
domestic sectoral price aggregates,  u  is domestic utility, r(p,v) is domestic revenue from 
production, and v is a vector of productive resources; m is the vector of imports, and f is the 
exogenously-determined net financial inflow from abroad. We can define B as the balance-of-
trade function, which captures the financial inflow necessary to keep the level of utility u
0 
constant when prices p change (Anderson and Neary, 1996). 
Based on equation (1) and considering prices p – a vector of domestic prices and p
w- a 
vector of world prices, and the level of utility u
0 as exogenous, B can be written as: 
(3)  B(p, u
0) =   e(p, u
0) - r(p, v) - (ep  - rp  )(p - p
w)  -  f 
                                                 
5 The time span is determined by tariff data availability.  
6 Bold letters denote vectors. 4 
 
We introduce TRI as the uniform tariff that keeps the welfare constant. In the framework 
presented above, TRI is the solution of the following non-linear equation: 
(4) B(p
w(1+ TRI), u
0) = B(p, u
0) 
 
Domestic prices contain trade distortions. We computed and solved equation (4) for all 
country/year combinations were data was available. To obtain consistent aggregators, we used all 
tariffs at the highest level of disaggregation for which data is available, i.e. six digits (World 
Bank, WITS)
7. Figure 1 presents the constructed TRIs, averaged over the period 2000-2004, 
relative to GDP per capita.  
 
 
3. Model Specification 
 
The model specification is as follows: 
 
lnGDPpcjt =  α + β1 lnTRIjt + β2 Geographyj + β3 Institutionsjt + β4 Macro Variablesjt + ejt  
 
 where lnGDPpcjt is the log GDP per capita of country j over period t, measured in PPP US 
dollars. lnTRIjt stands for Trade Restrictiveness Index; the Geographyj  variables are distance to 
the equator and a dummy for landlocked countries (Dollar and Kraay, 2002); Institutionsjt  
variables are Law and Order, and Government Stability (International Country Risk Guide, 
2007). Macro Variablesjt capture other factors that may impact income, like market size (proxied 
by population), human capital investment (proxied by secondary school enrollment), 
macroeconomic price stability (proxied by inflation rate), and the depth of financial sector 
(proxied by the average ratio of credit to GDP). All variables come from World Development 
Indicators database, World Bank, 2007. We also add to the regression the Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization of the population, which is likely to affect income (Alesina et al., 2003).
 We use 
five-year averages of all time-varying variables to smooth variations over time. 
 
                                                 
7 The TRI measure does not control for NTBs. 5 
 
The control variables of interest, in particular TRIjt and Institutionsjt are likely to be 
endogeneous. We instrument for TRIjt using its one period lag, and for institutions using the 
legal origin, i.e. whether a country has a British, German, French, Scandinavian, or Socialist 
origin for its legal system (see Bolaky and Freund, 2008, and Bormann et al. 2006, etc.).
  
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
The results using the OLS specification are presented in Table 1. We start with the basic 
regression where income is regressed on population, TRIjt index and the two geography 
variables: distance from equator, and the dummy for landlock countries. The TRIjt variable is 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that higher trade protection is associated with 
lower per capita income. Population has negative effect on per capita income; countries further 
away from the equator have higher income, while being landlocked negatively impacts income. 
Subsequently, we introduce the Ethnic fractionalization variable and one by one, the institutional 
variables. We find that Law and Order and Government Stability have a positive and significant 
effect on income per capita. We then account for macroeconomic policies that may affect 
income: inflation, the level of human capital and the development of financial sector. The TRIjt 
variable remains negative and statistically significant throughout. The coefficient is 
economically significant, as it implies that a 1% decrease in trade restrictiveness leads to an 
approximately 0.3% increase in income per capita. 
 
To avoid endogeneity bias, we re-estimate the above regressions using instrumental 
variables technique. The results are presented in Tables 2. The Shea partial R
2 and the Sargan 
test confirm the validity of the instruments. The TRIjt variable remains negative and statistically 
significant, confirming our hypothesis that lower trade protection is associated with higher 
income per capita.  
 
In conclusion, this study uses a new, innovative measure of openness to trade and finds 
that lower trade protection leads to higher levels of income per capita. The results are robust to 
accounting for geography-related, and institutional variables as well as correcting for possible 
endogeneity in estimation. 6 
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Table 1: OLS regressions          
 logTRIjt  -0.301***  -0.347*** -0.306*** -0.306*** -0.298*** -0.164***  -0.159** 
  [0.063]  [0.065] [0.066] [0.066] [0.066] [0.054] [0.066] 
logPopulationjt -0.100***  -0.043  -0.015  -0.016  -0.01  0.007  0.012 
  [0.024]  [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.026] [0.028] 
Landlockj  -0.971***  -0.852*** -0.705*** -0.707*** -0.660***  -0.288**  -0.452*** 
  [0.122]  [0.139] [0.150] [0.151] [0.152] [0.124] [0.139] 
Distance equatorj  0.032***  0.033*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***  0.008**  0.007* 
  [0.003]  [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Ethnic fractionalizationj    -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.004*** 
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Law & orderjt      0.193*** 0.195*** 0.174*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 
      [0.045] [0.046] [0.047] [0.039] [0.041] 
Govt. stabilityjt        -0.005 -0.018 -0.025 -0.039 
        [0.034] [0.034] [0.026] [0.030] 
Inflationjt         -0.007*  -0.002  -0.006 
         [0.004]  [0.003]  [0.004] 
  Secondary sch. enrollmentjt       0.017***  0.019*** 
         [0.002]  [0.002] 
  Claims private sectorjt          0.008** 
          [0.004] 
    Constant  10.394***  9.902*** 8.882*** 8.932*** 9.077*** 7.674*** 7.510*** 
  [0.441]  [0.565] [0.593] [0.670] [0.669] [0.538] [0.571] 
No.  Observations  270  205 195 195 195 180 143 
R-squared  0.54  0.7  0.71 0.71 0.72 0.84 0.82 
 Standard errors in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




Table 2.  Instrumental variables regressions     
          
          
logTRIjt  -0.262** -0.249** -0.251**  -0.148*  -0.148 
  [0.110] [0.117] [0.112] [0.088] [0.121] 
logPopulationjt 0.005  0.045  0.037  0.02  0.021 
 [0.047]  [0.072]  [0.063]  [0.042]  [0.043] 
Landlockj -0.923***  -0.599  -0.667  -0.572**  -0.663** 
 [0.230]  [0.483]  [0.412]  [0.287]  [0.292] 
Distance equatorj 0.001  0.002  0.002  -0.01  -0.01 
 [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011] 
Ethnic fractionalizationj -0.009***  -0.012***  -0.011***  -0.007***  -0.006** 
 [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Law & orderjt 0.505***  0.422**  0.426**  0.407**  0.375** 
 [0.158]  [0.198]  [0.182]  [0.171]  [0.156] 
Govt. stabilityjt   0.351  0.263  -0.022  0.003 
   [0.451]  [0.412]  [0.272]  [0.268] 
Inflationjt     -0.002  -0.006  -0.004 
     [0.011]  [0.015]  [0.016] 
Secondary sch. enrollmentjt       0.014***  0.017*** 
       [0.003]  [0.003] 
Claims private sectorjt         0.010 
         [0.006] 
No. Observations  108  108  108  98  74 
          
Shea partial R2 of first-stage regressions     
          
TRIjt 0.66  0.64  0.66  0.66  0.57 
Law & orderjt 0.17  0.13  0.15  0.11  0.14 
Govt. Stabilityjt 0.04  0.05  0.07  0.08 
          
Sargan overidentification test   2.58  1.76  1.84  4.11  0.88 
Chi-sq(1) P-val    0.28  0.18  0.17  0.05  0.35 
          
Standard errors in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   